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A NEW STANDARD TO GOVERN THE DISCRETION-
ARY BACK PAY REMEDY UNDER TITLE VII
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964:
ALBEMARLE PAPER CO. v. MOODY
Once it has been established that an employer has intentionally
engaged in an unlawful employment practice under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,' the trial court has the discretion to award the
aggrieved employee the back pay he has been denied as a result of the
employer's unlawful employment practice.2 Recent circuit court opin-
ions, reviewing the appropriateness of back pay awards on the trial court
level, have failed to reach an agreement as to the standard that should
govern the decision to grant or deny back pay.' The Supreme Court in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody4 has established a new standard, settling
this conflict among circuits.
The initial action in Albemarle, was a class action brought by
present and former black employees of the Albemarle Paper Company,
against their employer and union, seeking injunctive relief against "any
policy, practice, custom or usage" at the Albemarle Paper Company
plant violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.r Although
the trial court found the employer and union had in fact engaged in an
unlawful employment practice under Title VII, the employees' request
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), prohibits discrimination in private employment
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. IV, 1974) provides in pertinent part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the
complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or
labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employ-
ment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
3. See cases cited notes 11 & 12 supra. The Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), also decided the issue of the showing required of an
employer to establish job relatedness in preemployment testing. Id. at 425. The testing
issue is completely severable from the back pay issue and will not be discussed in this
note.
4. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
5. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 4 BNA PEP CAs. 561 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
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for back pay was denied.6 The court stated two grounds for its denial
of back pay: (1) the lack of any evidence of bad faith noncompliance
with Title VII by the employer, and (2) the fact that plaintiffs' did not
file their claim for back pay until nearly five years after the institution of
the original action.7 The court, focusing upon the equitable nature of
the back pay remedy, reasoned the defendants would be "substantially
prejudiced" if back pay were awarded at this late date, since if they had
known back pay was involved, they might have exercised "unusual zeal"
in having the case decided at an earlier date.8
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that back pay could
not be denied merely because the employer had not acted in bad faith.
The court of appeals also held that back pay could properly be request-
ed after the initial complaint is filed.10
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Albemarle, the various
circuits had failed to agree on any one standard. An examination of the
different standards adopted reveals a basic disagreement among the
circuits as to the scope of the trial judge's discretion to award or deny
back pay. While a few of the standards adopted recognized a very
broad discretion in the trial judge, 1 others severely limited the circum-
stances under which back pay could be denied the successful plaintiff.12
The Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Circuits, prior to the Court's decision
in Albemarle, adopted a standard" derived from the Supreme Court's
decision in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. 4 Newman, how-
ever, dealt with the discretionary attorneys' fees award under Title II of
6. Id. at 572. The trial court found Albemarle's job seniority program to be
unlawfully discriminatory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
7. 4 BNA FEP CAs. at 570.
8. Id.
9. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 1973).
10. Id. at 141-42.
11. See Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 922 (5th Cir. 1973) (the trial court in
exercising its discretion to award back pay should consider "factors of economic reality
(i.e., the relative expense of accurate determination of individual rights vis-a-vis the
amounts involved) and, most assuredly, the physical and fiscal limitations of the court to
properly grant and supervise relief."); Shaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d
1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972) (trial court in deciding to award back pay "must balance the
various equities between the parties and decide upon a result which is consistent with the
purposes of the Equal Employment Opportunities Act, and the fundamental concepts of
fairness."
12. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 253. (5th Cir. 1974);
Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 876 (6th Cir. 1973); Moody v.
Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
13. Cases cited note 12 supra.
14. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
[Vol. 11: 627
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964.15 There the Court held the parameters of
discretion of the trial judge are "necessarily narrowed" by the purposes
for which Congress enacted the discretionary attorneys' fees remedy.16
The Court reasoned that Congress provided the attorneys' fees provision
in order to encourage plaintiffs acting as "private attorneys general" to
bring injunctive actions under Title II. Injunctive actions would not
be encouraged however, and the purpose of the remedy would not be
accomplished unless the plaintiff was reasonably assured that if success-
ful, he would be awarded attorneys' fees. Hence, the standard adopted
by the Court in Newman incorporates a preference in favor of awarding
attorneys' fees; that is, attorneys' fees should ordinarily be awarded to
the successful plaintiff in all but special circumstances.8 The Fourth,
Fifth and Sixth Circuits applied the Newman standard by analogy to the
discretionary back pay remedy under Title VII and held that back pay
should ordinarily be awarded in all but special circumstances.19
The specific thrust of the Newman standard goes to the encour-
agement of injunctive actions under Title I, thereby vindicating the
public's interest in the elimination of housing discrimination in public
accommodations.20  This standard is directly in point with the discre-
tionary attorneys' fees provision under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.21 The public's interest in the elimination of discriminatory
employment practices can also be furthered by encouraging injunctive
actions under Title VII through regular awards of attorneys' fees. The
Supreme Court in Albemarle, while recognizing the applicability of the
Newman standard to the Title VII discretionary attorneys' fees provi-
sion, expressly rejected the applicability of this standard to the back pay
provision, opting instead to establish a new standard specifically applica-
ble to the back pay remedy. 2
Tim NEw STANDARD
The specific thrust of the Newman standard goes to the encour-
from the dual statutory objectives of Title VII. The Court articulated
the new standard as follows:
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)(3)(b) (1970).
16. 390 U.S. at 402.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Cases cited note 12 supra.
20. 422 U.S. at 415.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
22. 422 U.S. at 415.
1976]
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[Gliven a finding of unlawful discrimination, backpay should
be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would
not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating dis-
crimination throughout the economy and making persons
whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination.2 3
The dual statutory objectives of Title VII incorporated into the new
standard are (1) the elimination of discriminatory employment prac-
tices, and (2) the compensation of victims of unlawful discrimination.
The standard directs the trial judge to award back pay when, in his
opinion, the award will further the statutory objectives of Title VII
incorporated into the new standard. Thus an understanding of when
back pay should or should not be awarded can only be achieved through
an analysis of the role back pay plays in the accomplishment of these
statutory objectives.
The Supreme Court stated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 24 that the
primary objective of Title VII is the elimination of obstacles that have
operated in the past to deny certain classes of employees equal employ-
ment opportunities.2 5 This objective of Title VII incorporated into the
new standard can be furthered through the routine award of back pay to
the successful plaintiff.2 6 The potential liability of an employer against
whom a back pay judgment has been rendered is great. Hence, as
the Court noted in Albemarle, the "reasonably certain prospect" of a
back pay penalty can act as an inducement to the employer or union to
reevaluate their employment policies in light of the mandates of Title
VII, thereby facilitating the elimination of discriminatory employment
practices.28 Significantly, the employer would be induced to eliminate
questionably legal employment practices without the necessity of the
initiation of a lawsuit against him. In this regard, the Eighth Circuit in
United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc.29 observed: "If backpay is con-
sistently awarded, companies .. . will certainly find it in their best
interest to remedy employment procedures without court interven-
tion .... "3 0  Thus the new standard indicates that back pay should
23. Id. at 421 (footnote omitted).
24. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
25. Id. at 429.
26. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
27. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1973 § 1, at 1, col. 1. A.T.&T. in settlement of an
action brought for employment discrimination under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act,
agreed to pay fifteen million dollars in back pay to the aggrieved employees. Equal Pay
Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
28. 422 U.S. at 417-18.
29. 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973).
30. Id. at 379.
[Vol. 11: 627
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be routinely awarded since this would greatly facilitate the elimination
of discriminatory employment practices, a basic objective of Title VII.
The second statutory objective of Title VII which is to govern the
decision to award or deny back pay is directed at compensating the
victims of unlawful discrimination.3 1 An examination of the legislative
history of Title VII conclusively reveals the back pay provision of Title
VII was patterned after a similar provision of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).2 Both back pay remedies are discretionary;
that is, both sections 10(c) of the NLRA and section 5(g) of Title VII
statutorily authorize the granting of relief with or without pack pay. The
case law under the NLRA back pay provision establishes that the
primary purpose of the remedy is to compensate the victim of an unfair
labor practice, rather than to punish the employer.3 3 Since Congress
patterned the Title VII back pay remedy after the NLRA back pay
provision, the Court in Albemarle concluded it was the intention of
Congress that the Title VII remedy be similarly construed. 4
Section 5(g) of Title VII expressly conditions the back pay award
upon a finding that the employer has intentionally engaged in an
unlawfully discriminatory employment practice.3" The Fifth Circuit in
Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corp." after a review of the relevant
decisions of the other circuits concluded: "Intentional unfair employ-
ment practices are those engaged in deliberately and not accidentally.
No wilfullness on the part the employer need be shown to establish a
violation of section 706(g). 317
It is well established that a specific intent to discriminate on the
part of the employer need not be shown to justify a back pay recovery.38
31. 422 U.S. at 418. See 118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972) (Conference Committee
Report by Senator Williams).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). The drafters of Title VII expressly stated that
they were using the NLRA as a model. 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (1964) (remarks of
Senator Humphrey). The predecessor of Title VII was H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963). H.R. 405 provided for an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission mod-
eled after the National Labor Relations Board.
33. Under the NLRA, upon finding an unfair labor practice, back pay is routinely
awarded even though the employer acted in good faith. See American Machinery Corp.
v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1970); Laidlaw v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970). But see In re McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 19
N.L.R.B. 778 (1940) (refused to award back pay upon a finding of good faith on the
part of the employer).
34. 422 U.S. at 422.
35. See note 2 supra.
36. 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973).
37. Id. at 246.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973);
1976]
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An employer has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment
practice for which back pay may be awarded if he has implemented the
discriminatory practice deliberately and not accidentally."
The Court in Albemarle emphasized Title VIl's concern with the
consequences of employment discrimination and the lack of significance
under Title VII of the motivation or intent to discriminate on the part of
the employer:
Title VII is not concerned with the employer's "good intent
or -absence of discriminatory intent' for "Congress directed
the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment prac-
tices, and not simply the motivation."40
Since the intent of the employer is of no real significance, it is
unlikely that a good faith defense or a showing that the employer did
not specifically intend to discriminate will be successful. It is clearly the
purpose of the award, as the new standard indicates, to compensate the
victims of unlawful discrimination. 4 It is not the purpose of the award
to punish the employer for moral turpitude. Thus a trial court, exercis-
ing its discretion as guided by the new standard, would be furthering the
objectives of Title VII by awarding back pay even when the employer
had engaged in the unlawful employment practice in good faith. The
Court in Albemarle specifically rejected the good faith defense asserted
by the employer in that case.42
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), petition for cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006, 1007 (1971, 1972). The Fourth Circuit stated in Robinson:
[nIt is agreed that back pay should not be awarded in the absence of a specificintent to discriminate .... The principal answer. . . is that back pay is not
a penalty imposed as a sanction for moral turpitude; it is compensation for the
tangible economic loss resulting from an unlawful employment practice.
Id. at 804.
39. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 251 (5th Cir. 1974);
Shaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972);
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 1971); Sprogis v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 796 (4th Cir. 1971), petition for
cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006, 1007 (1971, 1972); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight,
Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); Local 189,
United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 996 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 919 (1970).
40. 422 U.S. at 422, quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)
(emphasis in original).
41. Cases cited note 38 supra.
42. The employer's good faith defense was based on the fact that judicial decisions
had only recently elucidated the discriminatory impact of seniority systems such as the
one that had been implemented for a considerable period of time by the Albemarle
Company. Furthermore, as early as 1968, the Albemarle Company had attempted to
recruit black employees into one of its departments and to eliminate strict segregation
through a departmental merger.
[Vol. 11: 627
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CONCLUSION
Although the back pay award is essentially compensatory rather
than punitive in nature, there is little doubt that from the employer's
standpoint the award is a penalty.43 Thus, where the employer is in
good faith and free from wilful wrongdoing, the courts are faced with the
dilemma of penalizing one of two innocent parties. If they elect to
exonerate the good faith employer and not award back pay, they are
penalizing the innocent employee who has lost his wages as a result of
unlawful discrimination.
Courts faced with this problem in the past, while noting that the
good faith employer may have equities in his favor, have justifiably
emphasized the compensatory nature of the Title VII back pay remedy
and awarded the employee back pay.44 The Fifth Circuit in Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co.4" reasoned that as between the good faith
employer and the aggrieved employee, it is fairer to award back pay
since the employer may be better financially able to bear the loss.
46
There are a number of decisions under Title VII, where the good
faith of the employer has led the court to deny the aggrieved employee
back pay.47 The employer's defense in these cases was his good faith
reliance upon state female protective legislation, which restricted the
hours a female could be required to work or the weight a female
employee could be required to lift. Reliance by the employer upon
these statutes in formulating his employment policies resulted in a
sexually discriminatory employment practice under Title VII. The
43. See Davidson, "Back Pay" Awards Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 741, 745 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Davidson].
44. See, e.g., Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 876 (6th Cir.
1973); Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 721 (7th Cir. 1969). But see
United States v. St. Louis S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 311 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1107, 1116 (1973) (back pay denied aggrieved employee because the employer was
acting in good faith).
45. 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Davidson, supra note 43, at 745.
46. 494 F.2d at 252 n.120.
47. See, e.g. Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 840 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973);
Manning v. International Union, 466 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
946 (1973); Leblanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
Title VII expressly provides an employer with a good faith defense for all actions
taken in good faith reliance upon a published guideline of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1970). Commentators have
viewed this provision as an indiciation that Congress intended for the good faith defense
to play a very narrow role under Title VII. See Davidson, supra note 43, at 746.
Justice Blackmun, concurring in Albemarle, suggests that good faith reliance upon a
state's female protective labor statute should provide the employer with a valid defense
under Title VII. 422 U.S. at 448 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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courts in these instances found the equities in favor of the innocent em-
ployers who had justifiably relied upon a state statute to exceed those of
the aggrieved employees and therefore denied the employees' request for
back pay.48
The Albemarle decision may be read to eliminate this dilemma.
The Court has placed the burden upon the employer to presently
reevaluate his employment practices or face a reasonably certain back
pay penalty.49 If an employment practice is subsequently found to be
unlawfully discriminatory, it must be presumed that the employer ne-
glected to consider the foreseeable consequences of his conduct. Hence,
although the employer may have acted in good faith in the sense that he
did not intend the discriminatory consequences of his employment
practices, his equities can never rise as high as those of the aggrieved
employee and he should bear the loss.2
Richard L. DeLucia
48. See cases cited note 48 supra.
49. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
50. The Court in Albemarle remanded on the issue of the "substantial prejudice"
that allegedly resulted to the defendants as a result of the inconsistent demands for back
pay made by the plaintiffs. Back pay would be denied upon a finding by the district
court that the defendants were in fact prejudiced. 422 U.S. at 424.
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